{"id":3979,"date":"2026-09-14T05:05:40","date_gmt":"2026-09-14T05:05:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-act-requirements"},"modified":"2026-09-14T05:05:40","modified_gmt":"2026-09-14T05:05:40","slug":"foreign-robocall-elimination-act-requirements","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-act-requirements","title":{"rendered":"Foreign Robocall Elimination Act: S.2666 Explained"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><em>Written by: Matt Beucler, CEO, Plura AI<\/em><\/p>\n<h2 id=\"key-takeaways\">Key Takeaways<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li>S.2666 establishes an interagency task force to study foreign robocall issues. It does not impose immediate technical mandates on providers.<\/li>\n<li>The bill\u2019s most concrete obligation is the Robocall Mitigation Database (RMD) bond requirement of up to $100,000 for certain providers filing certifications.<\/li>\n<li>S.2666 extends the traceback consortium renewal period from annually to once every three years and grants immunity for sharing traceback information.<\/li>\n<li>The legislation directs study of STIR\/SHAKEN adequacy for foreign-originated calls, international authentication standards, and cross-border text messaging compliance. It does not mandate specific technical solutions.<\/li>\n<li>Plura AI operates the carrier-level controls these provisions point toward. Its platform runs <a href=\"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/plura-webchat\" target=\"_blank\">AI webchat<\/a> and STIR\/SHAKEN authentication on 100% U.S. infrastructure.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"22\" data-disclaimer-index=\"1\">1<\/sup><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h2>STIR\/SHAKEN Study Requirement Under S.2666<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">S.2666 Section 2(d)(2)(G) directs the task force to determine whether STIR\/SHAKEN technical standards adequately provide call authentication for unlawful robocalls from foreign originating providers or foreign intermediate providers through gateway providers in the United States.<\/a> This provision functions as a study mandate under the task force\u2019s report. It does not create a new attestation requirement.<\/p>\n<p>Section 2(d)(2)(G) is one of 17 enumerated matters to be studied (subparagraphs A through Q) that the task force must examine in preparing its report.<\/p>\n<p>The bill imposes no new authentication deployment obligation on gateway providers. <a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/CRPT-119srpt122\/CRPT-119srpt122\/related\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">Senate Report 119-122, dated June 1, 2026, identifies S.2666 as a bill \u201cto direct the Federal Communications Commission to establish a taskforce on unlawful robocalls, and for other purposes,\u201d which confirms the bill\u2019s core structure as a directive to create a task force rather than a set of self-executing technical mandates.<\/a><\/p>\n<p>As of early 2026, large U.S. carriers have achieved over 95% STIR\/SHAKEN implementation, but only about 45% of total call traffic is fully signed, due to smaller non-facilities-based providers relying on non-IP legacy infrastructure and technical challenges with international traffic at gateway providers.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"24\" data-disclaimer-index=\"3\">3<\/sup> The task force\u2019s study of STIR\/SHAKEN adequacy for foreign-originated calls addresses this coverage gap without prescribing a specific technical remedy in the statute.<\/p>\n<h2>Gateway Provider Obligations Under S.2666<\/h2>\n<p>The most concrete obligation in S.2666 is the Robocall Mitigation Database bond provision. <a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">S.2666 Section 5(b)(1) directs the FCC to issue rules requiring a provider to post a bond of not more than $100,000 before filing a certification to the Robocall Mitigation Database, if the Commission determines the bond is necessary to preserve the integrity of the database.<\/a><\/p>\n<p>This requirement applies to providers that file certifications to the RMD, as defined in 47 CFR 64.6300. It does not apply to all telecom entities generally. Under current law, voice service providers must certify annually to the Robocall Mitigation Database. S.2666 would add a bond-posting precondition to that annual certification for certain providers.<\/p>\n<p>S.2666 Section 5(b)(2) directs the FCC to exempt providers from the bond requirement where it is not necessary to deter unlawful robocall activity. To determine which providers qualify, the FCC must consider whether a provider:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Is registered with the Commission under 47 CFR 64.1195 and contributes to the Universal Service Fund (USF) under 47 U.S.C. 254(d)<\/li>\n<li>Holds a state public utility commission (PUC) certificate of authority, license, or registration<\/li>\n<li>Is an issuer with securities listed on a national securities exchange<\/li>\n<li>Presents other indicia of being a bona fide, established communications service provider<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">S.2666 Section 5(c) directs the FCC to require bonds from providers that cannot demonstrate legitimate ongoing operations, regulatory oversight sufficient to ensure accountability, or the ability to pay fines or forfeitures.<\/a> At the same time, it directs the FCC to establish categorical exemptions for identifiable classes of legitimate providers and to minimize administrative and financial burdens on compliant, established, regulated providers.<\/p>\n<p>The Congressional Budget Office\u2019s May 26, 2026 cost estimate states that the number of providers affected by S.2666\u2019s bond requirement would be small and the likelihood of forfeiture would be low. CBO estimates that any resulting increase in revenues would be insignificant over the 2026-2036 period.<\/p>\n<p>Beyond the bond provision, S.2666 also changes how the FCC designates the traceback consortium.<\/p>\n<h2>Foreign Robocall Elimination Act Traceback Consortium Extension<\/h2>\n<p>S.2666 Section 3 amends Section 13(d)(2) of the Pallone-Thune TRACED Act (Public Law 116-105) by striking the word \u201cannually\u201d and inserting \u201conce every 3 years,\u201d changing the FCC\u2019s schedule for designating the registered traceback consortium from an annual renewal to a three-year renewal cycle.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/welch.senate.gov\/senate-passes-welch-budds-bipartisan-bill-to-crack-down-on-foreign-robocalls\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">The longer three-year designation period is framed as helping the Industry Traceback Group (ITG) focus on tracing unlawful robocalls instead of filing yearly renewal applications.<\/a> The FCC re-opens the designation process once every three years instead of annually, which reduces administrative re-designation proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>The underlying obligation to answer traceback requests promptly remains in place. Under existing FCC rules, voice service providers must cooperate with ITG traceback requests within 24 hours, and failure to cooperate can result in account termination or removal from the RMD. S.2666\u2019s extension of the renewal cycle does not alter that cooperation requirement.<\/p>\n<p>S.2666 Section 4(a) adds a new paragraph (3) to Section 13(d) of the TRACED Act. It grants the registered consortium immunity from any cause of action in any court for receiving, sharing, or publishing \u201ccovered information\u201d about suspected fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful robocalls, illegally spoofed calls, and other illegal calls. This includes call detail records and identifying information about originating, carrying, routing, and transmitting voice service providers.<\/p>\n<h2>International Authentication And Foreign-Provider Identification<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">S.2666 Section 2(d)(2)(F) directs the task force to examine how better implementation of technical solutions such as traceback and caller ID authentication in foreign originating countries would improve coordination between the United States and foreign countries in combating unlawful robocalls.<\/a> This provision functions as a study item, not an operational mandate.<\/p>\n<p>S.2666 Section 2(d)(2)(G) separately directs the task force to determine whether it would be desirable to encourage other countries to adopt STIR\/SHAKEN standards. This language directs study of desirability. The statute does not mandate international STIR\/SHAKEN adoption.<\/p>\n<p>S.2666 Section 2(d)(2) also directs the task force to identify the foreign countries that are the highest-volume points of departure for unlawful robocalls into the United States. Although about 90% of all robocalls appear to originate within the United States, FTC research indicates that a \u201csignificant proportion, if not the majority, of illegal robocalls originate overseas,\u201d which places many fraudulent campaigns beyond the reach of U.S. enforcement.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"24\" data-disclaimer-index=\"3\">3<\/sup><\/p>\n<h2>Cross-Border Text Messaging Assessment<\/h2>\n<p>S.2666 Section 2(d)(2)(Q) directs the task force to examine mechanisms for improving compliance with the requirements imposed under Sections 6 and 7 of the Pallone-Thune TRACED Act (47 U.S.C. 227b-1 and 47 U.S.C. 227 note). This includes an assessment of whether voice authentication techniques extend to unlawful international SMS (Short Message Service) traffic.<\/p>\n<p>The FCC explicitly declined to adopt text authentication requirements, finding that authentication solutions for text messages were preliminary and required more study. STIR\/SHAKEN is used to authenticate caller ID information for voice calls, not for text messages. The task force\u2019s examination of cross-border text messaging functions as a study item that addresses an acknowledged gap in the existing framework. It does not mandate deployment of a specific solution.<\/p>\n<h2>Technical Boundaries Of The Foreign Robocall Elimination Act<\/h2>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">S.2666\u2019s operative text contains no SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) header requirements, packet formats, API (Application Programming Interface) specifications, or carrier-level signaling mandates.<\/a> Engineers scoping implementation work can focus on the statute\u2019s structural directives rather than protocol details.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The bill\u2019s provisions are limited to establishing an interagency task force, amending the TRACED Act\u2019s consortium notice and immunity provisions, and directing FCC rules on an RMD bond.<\/li>\n<li>S.2666 Section 2(d)(2)(O) requires the task force to identify voluntary best practices for identification and blocking of unlawful robocalls that telephone service providers and technology solution providers can voluntarily implement. These best practices function as voluntary guidance rather than binding technical requirements.<\/li>\n<li>The bill leaves technical standards to future FCC rulemaking or industry practice.<\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/CRPT-119srpt122\/CRPT-119srpt122\/related\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">Senate Report 119-122 contains no protocol-level implementation instructions. No SIP header specifications, packet format definitions, or certification API payload requirements appear in the report\u2019s description, which instead addresses the Act\u2019s general anti-robocall mission and enforcement direction.<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>This boundary is operationally significant. Carriers and VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol) engineers do not face a new build obligation from the statute itself. Any technical requirements that emerge will come from subsequent FCC rulemaking, not from S.2666\u2019s enacted text.<\/p>\n<h2>Foreign Robocall Elimination Act Vs. FCC Proposed Rules For Foreign-Originated Calls<\/h2>\n<p>The three-way boundary between what S.2666 mandates now, what it directs the task force to study, and what the FCC\u2019s separate proposed rules would require is the central operational distinction for gateway providers and VoIP engineers.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What S.2666 mandates now:<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>FCC rules on an RMD bond of up to $100,000 (Section 5(b)(1))<\/li>\n<li>Traceback consortium renewal extension from one year to three years (Section 3)<\/li>\n<li>Consortium immunity for sharing traceback information (Section 4(a))<\/li>\n<li>Authority to publish a list of non-cooperative or high-volume-violator providers (Section 4(b))<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>What S.2666 directs the FCC task force to study:<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>STIR\/SHAKEN adequacy for foreign-originated calls (Section 2(d)(2)(G))<\/li>\n<li>International authentication adoption and foreign-provider identification (Section 2(d)(2)(F))<\/li>\n<li>Cross-border text messaging compliance mechanisms (Section 2(d)(2)(Q))<\/li>\n<li>DOJ enforcement resources and a dedicated robocall enforcement office (Section 2(d)(2)(J))<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>What the FCC\u2019s separate proposed rules (CG Docket No. 26-52) would require:<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/thefederalregister.org\/documents\/2026-18366\/improving-the-effectiveness-of-the-robocall-mitigation-database-call-authentication-trust-anchor-advanced-methods-to-tar\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">The FCC\u2019s Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM) was adopted July 22, 2026 and released July 23, 2026.<\/a> It proposes three requirements: providers must certify that their robocall mitigation program includes reasonable steps to avoid originating, carrying, or processing illegal robocall traffic, commit to respond within 24 hours to traceback requests from the Commission, law enforcement, and the industry traceback consortium, and cooperate with those entities in investigating and stopping illegal robocallers.<\/p>\n<p>The Commission also proposes to require voice service providers to implement measures to ensure that consumers know which calls originate from outside of the United States and to prohibit spoofing of United States telephone numbers for calls that originate from outside of the United States.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/thefederalregister.org\/documents\/2026-18366\/improving-the-effectiveness-of-the-robocall-mitigation-database-call-authentication-trust-anchor-advanced-methods-to-tar\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">Under current FCC rules, domestic voice service providers must only accept calls that use U.S. NANP (North American Numbering Plan) resources in the caller ID field from foreign voice service providers whose filings appear in the RMD and have not been removed.<\/a> The proposed rules would strengthen those filing obligations, clarify which entities must file, and add screening, noncompliance identification, expedited removal, and anti-re-entry safeguards. Comments on the FCC\u2019s July 2026 proposed rules (FCC 26-49, adopted July 22, 2026) are due October 9, 2026 and reply comments November 9, 2026.<\/p>\n<p>The 24-hour traceback response expectation and the RMD certification of reasonable mitigation steps appear in the FCC\u2019s proposed rules. They do not appear as S.2666 statutory mandates. Providers should consult 47 CFR 64.6305 and qualified counsel when assessing their obligations under each track.<\/p>\n<p>The table below consolidates the provisions discussed so far into a single reference.<\/p>\n<h2>Foreign Robocall Elimination Act Provision-By-Provision Comparison Table<\/h2>\n<p>The table below maps each S.2666 provision to its operational effect so leaders can see where direct provider obligations arise.<\/p>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<th>S.2666 Provision<\/th>\n<th>What It Does<\/th>\n<th>Provider Obligation<\/th>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">Section 2(b)<\/a><\/td>\n<td>Establishes interagency task force within 270 days of enactment<\/td>\n<td>None<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td><a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/BILLS-119s2666es\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">Section 2(d)(2)(G)<\/a><\/td>\n<td>Directs task force to study STIR\/SHAKEN adequacy for foreign-originated calls<\/td>\n<td>None<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Section 3<\/td>\n<td>Extends traceback consortium renewal from annually to once every 3 years<\/td>\n<td>None<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Section 4(a)<\/td>\n<td>Grants consortium immunity for sharing traceback information<\/td>\n<td>None<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Section 4(b)<\/td>\n<td>Authorizes FCC and consortium to publish list of non-cooperative providers<\/td>\n<td>Indirect (vendor due diligence)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>Section 5(b)(1)<\/td>\n<td>Directs FCC rules on RMD bond of not more than $100,000<\/td>\n<td>Yes (bond posting for certain RMD filers)<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>The following questions address the most common points of confusion about S.2666\u2019s scope and status.<\/p>\n<h2>Frequently Asked Questions<\/h2>\n<h3>Does The Foreign Robocall Elimination Act Require STIR\/SHAKEN?<\/h3>\n<p>No. As covered above, S.2666 treats STIR\/SHAKEN adequacy for foreign-originated calls as a study item, not a deployment requirement. Any future requirement would come from FCC rulemaking. Providers should monitor FCC dockets and consult qualified counsel for developments in that track.<\/p>\n<h3>What Technical Requirements Does S.2666 Impose On Gateway Providers?<\/h3>\n<p>The bond provision described above is the bill\u2019s most concrete obligation. It applies only to providers filing RMD certifications. Established, regulated providers may qualify for exemptions under Section 5(b)(2) based on FCC registration, USF contributions, state PUC authority, national securities exchange listing, or other indicia of bona fide operations. The statute contains no SIP header requirements, packet formats, or API specifications. Technical standards for foreign robocall mitigation remain within future FCC rulemaking or industry practice.<\/p>\n<h3>How Does S.2666 Differ From The FCC\u2019s Proposed Rules?<\/h3>\n<p>S.2666 functions as a statute that directs study and limited rulemaking. Its concrete mandates are the RMD bond provision and the traceback consortium renewal extension. The FCC\u2019s separate proposed rules under CG Docket No. 26-52 would impose additional operational requirements, including the traceback response commitment described above, certification that robocall mitigation programs include reasonable steps to avoid processing illegal traffic, and measures to identify foreign-originated calls to consumers. Those proposed rules form a separate regulatory track from S.2666 and are subject to a public comment period closing October 9, 2026.<\/p>\n<h3>What Is The Status Of S.2666 As Of September 2026?<\/h3>\n<p>S.2666 passed the Senate by unanimous consent on August 3, 2026, and was held at the desk in the House as of August 10, 2026. The bill has not yet been passed by the House, sent to the President, or enacted into law. <a href=\"https:\/\/govinfo.gov\/app\/details\/CRPT-119srpt122\/CRPT-119srpt122\/related\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee reported the bill on June 1, 2026, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, accompanied by Senate Report 119-122.<\/a> Providers should monitor the bill\u2019s House progress and consult qualified counsel before treating any S.2666 provision as an enacted obligation.<\/p>\n<h3>Does S.2666 Change Existing TCPA Or DNC Obligations?<\/h3>\n<p>S.2666 does not alter underlying Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) or Telemarketing Sales Rule requirements. Prior express written consent, Do-Not-Call (DNC) scrubbing, and accurate caller ID obligations remain as established under existing law. S.2666\u2019s operative provisions are limited to the interagency task force, the RMD bond, the traceback consortium renewal extension, and consortium immunity. Providers should consult the relevant statutes and qualified counsel for their specific TCPA and DNC obligations.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"23\" data-disclaimer-index=\"2\">2<\/sup><\/p>\n<h2>Conclusion: S.2666 And Carrier-Level Controls<\/h2>\n<p>S.2666 directs study and recommendation. It does not impose a new technical mandate. Its RMD bond provision and traceback consortium extension create concrete operational consequences for certain providers. The FCC\u2019s separate proposed rules would add requirements on foreign-originated traffic, including a 24-hour traceback response commitment and certification of reasonable mitigation steps. Providers navigating both tracks should consult 47 CFR 64.6305 and qualified counsel.<\/p>\n<p>Plura AI is an FCC-licensed platform of AI agents that run <a href=\"https:\/\/plura.ai\/ai-voice-demo\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">AI voice agent<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/plura.ai\/ai-sms-leads\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">AI SMS<\/a>, RCS, and <a href=\"https:\/\/plura.ai\/plura-webchat\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noindex nofollow\">website chat agent<\/a> conversations on 100% U.S. infrastructure. Plura holds its own FCC carrier license and operating company number, which lets it run STIR\/SHAKEN authentication on every outbound call and issue branded caller ID at the carrier level. Because these controls sit inside the platform, real-time DNC scrubbing, TCPA-litigator screening, automated quiet hours, and immutable consent logging are enforced before dial rather than bolted on after the fact.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"22\" data-disclaimer-index=\"1\">1<\/sup> For high-volume operators assessing their compliance posture under S.2666\u2019s emerging framework and the FCC\u2019s parallel rulemaking track, Plura\u2019s carrier-grade infrastructure aligns with the regulatory environment these provisions anticipate.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/plura.ai\/pricing\" target=\"_blank\">Compare plans and rates side by side.<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/plura.ai\/calculator\" target=\"_blank\">Run your numbers through Plura\u2019s calculator to check your ROI in real time.<sup data-disclaimer-id=\"24\" data-disclaimer-index=\"3\">3<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<hr data-disclaimer-divider=\"true\">\n<div data-disclaimer-footer=\"true\">\n<p data-disclaimer-id=\"22\" data-disclaimer-type=\"content_based\"><sup data-disclaimer-index=\"1\">1<\/sup> Plura AI maintains SOC 2, HIPAA, ISO, and GDPR posture as part of its platform infrastructure. References to compliance frameworks in this article describe Plura\u2019s platform capabilities and do not constitute a guarantee that any customer using Plura will themselves be compliant with applicable laws or standards. Customers remain solely responsible for their own regulatory obligations, certifications, consent management, recordkeeping, and the claims they make to their own end users. Consult qualified legal counsel for guidance specific to your use case.<\/p>\n<p data-disclaimer-id=\"23\" data-disclaimer-type=\"content_based\"><sup data-disclaimer-index=\"2\">2<\/sup> This article describes regulatory frameworks at a general level and does not constitute legal advice. Laws and regulations vary by jurisdiction, change over time, and apply differently depending on facts and circumstances. Readers should consult qualified legal counsel before making compliance decisions.<\/p>\n<p data-disclaimer-id=\"24\" data-disclaimer-type=\"content_based\"><sup data-disclaimer-index=\"3\">3<\/sup> Performance figures, customer outcomes, and industry statistics referenced in this article are drawn from cited third-party sources or Plura customer case studies. Individual results vary based on implementation, use case, industry, audience, and execution. Past or aggregate performance is not a guarantee of future results.<\/p>\n<p data-disclaimer-id=\"21\" data-disclaimer-type=\"fixed\">This article is provided for informational purposes only and reflects Plura AI\u2019s understanding at the time of publication. Product capabilities, integrations, and specifications are subject to change. For the most current information, visit plura.ai.<\/p>\n<p data-disclaimer-id=\"27\" data-disclaimer-type=\"fixed\">This article was produced with the assistance of AI tools and reviewed by Plura AI prior to publication.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<section data-read-next=\"true\">\n<h2>Read Next<\/h2>\n<ul>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-act-effectiveness\" target=\"_blank\">Foreign Robocall Elimination Act: S.2666 Explained<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-act-blocking\" target=\"_blank\">S.2666 and Gateway Provider Duties for Foreign Robocalls<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-fcc-guidelines\" target=\"_blank\">Foreign Robocall Elimination Act FCC Guidelines for Gateways<\/a><\/li>\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/foreign-robocall-elimination-act-provisions\" target=\"_blank\">Foreign Robocall Elimination Act: 4 Key Provisions<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/section>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Plura AI breaks down S.2666&#8217;s gateway provider rules, STIR\/SHAKEN study, and traceback requirements for contact center and enterprise teams.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":106,"featured_media":3978,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-3979","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-ai-contact-centers"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3979","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3979"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3979\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3978"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3979"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3979"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.plura.ai\/articles\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3979"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}